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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Monte Moon appeals the district court's denial of his I.C.R. 35 motion to correct 
an illegal sentence, in which he argued that the charging document failed to confer 
jurisdiction upon the district court in the case below. He contends the district court erred 
when it concluded that I.C.R. 35 was not a proper vehicle to raise such a challenge 
when Idaho Supreme Court precedent holds to the contrary. He also contends that the 
record, on its face, clearly shows that the charging document did not confer jurisdiction. 
As a result, he requests that this Court at least remand for a decision on the merits of 
his motion, though he contends that it should remand with instructions to vacate the 
judgment of conviction. 
The State responds to Mr. Moon's argument regarding I.C.R. 35 as the proper 
vehicle for such a motion, contending that the scope of I.C.R. 35 is limited to exclude 
such challenges. In so arguing, the State relies on a decision that pre-dates the Idaho 
Supreme Court's decision explicitly recognizing that I.C.R. 35 is an appropriate vehicle 
to raise such challenges to the charging document. Even if that older decision controls, 
Mr. Moon's challenge falls within the narrowed scope of the rule, and so the State's 
argument in this regard should be rejected. 
The State responds to Mr. Moon's argument on the merits of his claim with 
several contentions, all of which are unsupported by the law. First, it asserts that this 
claim should have been raised before Mr. Moon entered his guilty plea, ignoring the 
explicit language from the cases it cites that exempts challenges like Mr. Moon's from 
the scope of their ruling. In fact, discussing that distinction, the Court of Appeals 
1 
vacated a judgment of conviction because the charging document did not confer 
jurisdiction to the district court, even though the defendant's arguments in that regard 
were made for the first time on appeal. 
Second, the State contends that the relevant statute, as it existed when 
Mr. Moon supposedly committed the crime, did criminalize the alleged acts. However, 
the State's reading of that statute is unreasonable, and actually, has been subsequently 
rejected by the Court of Appeals (the State would have this Court not consider that 
precedent based only on the timing of the decision). The State's reading of the relevant 
portion of the statute would render a subsequent portion of the statute superfluous. 
Given. a proper and complete understanding of the precedential decisions in this area, it 
is clear that the statute, as it then existed, did not criminalize the specific acts alleged in 
the Information. To that end, the State would also have this Court ignore the fact that 
the Legislature actually subsequently amended this statute with the purpose of 
criminalizing the act Mr. Moon was alleged to have committed. 
As such, this Court should reverse the district court's decision denying the 
I.C.R. 35 motion with instructions to vacate the judgment of conviction, or at least, 
remand this case for a determination on its merits. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Moon's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUES 
1. Whether the district court erroneously determined it was not authorized to 
consider Mr. Moon's claims when it was, in fact, required to do so, and so 
erroneously denied his I.C.R. 35 motion. 
2. Whether Mr. Moon's conviction for escape should be vacated because the 
district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction, since Mr. Moon's actions 
did not constitute a crime under the statute as it existed at that time. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Erroneously Determined It Was Not Authorized To Consider 
Mr. Moon's Claims When It Was, In Fact, Required To Do So, And So Erroneously 
Denied His l.C.R. 35 Motion 
A. Introduction 
This case is similar to that in State v. Lute, in that there are two questions 
regarding jurisdiction at issue. First, "[w]e must determine whether the district court had 
subject matter jurisdiction to consider the charges filed against [the defendant]." 
State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837, 839 (2011 ). Second, "[i]f we find that the district court had 
subject matter jurisdiction over the case initially, then this Court must determine whether 
the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to grant the relief requested by [the 
defendant] under his I.C.R. 35 motion where [the defendant] attacked the conviction 
itself, not merely the sentence." Id. While the State lumps its analysis on these 
separate questions into a single argument, they are more properly discussed 
separately, starting with whether the I.C.R. 35 motion properly brought this issue 
before the district court. Current Idaho Supreme Court precedent reveals, contrary to 
the State's contention, that l.C.R. 35 is a proper vehicle by which these sorts of 
challenges may be made. 
B. l.C.R. 35 Is An Appropriate Mechanism With Which To Raise These Sort Of 
Claims 
The State mistakenly believes that Mr. Moon's argument does not fall within the 
scope of I.C.R. 35, based on its misinterpretation of the holding in State v. Clements, 
148 Idaho 82 (2009). (Resp. Br., pp.10-13.) While Clements did narrow the scope of 
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I.C.R. 35, it also explicitly stated that I.C.R. 35 still applies to "a narrow category of 
cases in which the sentence imposes a penalty that is simply not authorized by 
law . ... " Clements, 148 Idaho at 86 (emphasis added). As the Court of Appeals has 
pointed out, I.C. § 19-301 (1) states, '"[e]very person is liable to punishment by the laws 
of this state, for a public offense committed by him therein. . . . Evidence 
that a prosecutable act was committed within the state of Idaho is a jurisdictional 
requisite .... "' State v. Olin, 153 Idaho 891, 894 n.3 (Ct. App. 2012), rev. denied 
(quoting I.C. § 19-301(1)) (emphasis in italics from Olin; emphasis in bold added). 
Therefore, Idaho law only authorizes punishment if the court had jurisdiction over the 
case to begin with. See I.C. § 19-301(1). As a result, asserting that Idaho law did not 
make the alleged act prosecutable (i.e., the law did not criminalize the alleged act) is 
one way to assert that the sentence imposes a penalty that is simply not authorized by 
the law. See I.C. § 19-301(1); Olin, 153 Idaho at 894 n.3. As such, even under 
Clements' limitation of the scope of I.C.R. 35, these sorts of challenges are within the 
scope of I.C.R. 35. See Clements, 148 Idaho at 86. 
In that regard, Clements is consistent with prior Idaho Supreme Court precedent 
(which the State does not cite in its brief) which recognized that '"the failure of an 
indictment to charge a crime is a fundamental defect that can be raised at any time."' 
State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482, 484 (2003) (quoting State v. Byington, 135 Idaho 
621, 624 (Ct. App. 1993)) (emphasis added). In fact, it is so important that the courts 
cannot refuse to address it when such an issue is brought to their attention. Kavajecz, 
139 Idaho at 483; State v. Mowrey, 91 Idaho 693, 695 (1967). Such a fundamental 
defect renders the proceedings and decisions in a case to be void (i.e., of no legal 
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effect, i.e., not legal). Mowrey, 91 Idaho at 695. Since such a challenge contends that 
the conviction was not legal, it falls within the scope of I.C.R. 35, as interpreted by 
Clements. See Clements, 148 Idaho at 86. 
In fact, the Idaho Supreme Court said as much only two years after deciding 
Clements. In considering this very question - whether a challenge to the conviction for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to a deficient charging instrument is properly 
brought in an I.C.R. 35 motion - the Idaho Supreme Court held "where a court properly 
has jurisdiction to consider a case-as it does here to consider Lute's /.C.R. 35 
motion .... " Lute, 150 Idaho at 840 (emphasis added). It is evident that the Idaho 
Supreme Court decided I.C.R. 35 motion was a proper vehicle to bring the jurisdictional 
challenge since it "reverse[d] the district court's denial of Lute's I.C.R. 35 motion ... ," 
as opposed to affirming the denial of that motion as an improper challenge. Id. at 841. 
Thus, Lute makes it clear that these sorts of challenges are still properly made through 
I.C.R. 35 motions post-Clements. Therefore, the State's argument in this regard is 
meritless. Clements does not prevent Mr. Moon from raising this challenge through an 
I.C.R. 35 motion. In this case, as in Lute, the collateral challenge to the conviction 
based on an alleged lack of jurisdiction, made through an I.C.R. 35 motion, should have 
been considered by the district court. See Lute, 150 Idaho at 840-41. 
The State also erroneously believes that there is some significance in the fact 
that the Supreme Court found that the district court did not have jurisdiction in Lute 
because the grand jury had exceeded its term and not because the acts alleged were 
not criminalized by the statute. (Resp. Br., p.12.) That argument is also meritless as it 
ignores the specific question at issue. That question is whether the motion pursuant to 
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I.C.R. 35 is a proper vehicle through which to raise a jurisdictional challenge to the 
charging document in the district court. The Supreme Court's answer to that specific 
question is clear: I.C.R. 35 is a proper vehicle to raise a jurisdictional challenge. Lute, 
150 Idaho at 840; Clements, 148 Idaho at 86. It does not matter whether the challenge 
asserts jurisdiction was lacking because the grand jury issued the indictment beyond its 
term or because the statute cited did not criminalize the actions alleged. Both scenarios 
raise the same challenge: whether the charging document failed to confer subject 
matter jurisdiction on the district court. And both do so properly through I.C.R. 35. Id. 
The result of a proper application of Lute and Clements is that the district court in 
this case erroneously determined that it was not authorized to consider the claims 
raised in the I.C.R. 35 motion. (See R., p.36.) As such, at a minimum, this Court 
should remand this case for an actual determination on the merits of Mr. Moon's claims. 
However, looking to the second distinct question subject to review under the Lute 
framework, Lute, 150 Idaho at 839, that is not truly necessary. The record, contrary to 
the State's assertions, clearly shows that the alleged conduct was not criminalized by 
the then-existing statute, and therefore, the charging document did not confer 
jurisdiction upon the district court to consider the charge of escape contained therein. 
11. 
Mr. Moon's Conviction For Escape Should Be Vacated Because The District Court Did 
Not Have Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Since Mr. Moon's Actions Did Not Constitute A 
Crime Under The Statute As It Existed At That Time 
A. Introduction 
Under the second line of analysis under the Lute framework, "this Court must 
determine whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to grant the relief 
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requested by [the defendant] under his I.C.R. 35 motion where [the defendant] attacked 
the conviction itself, not merely the sentence." Lute, 150 Idaho at 839. The State's 
contention, that such challenges must be made before trial or entry of a guilty plea, is 
not supported by precedent. 
Additionally, the State's reading of the relevant statute, which would allow the 
prosecution in this case, is erroneous because it would render other portions of the 
statute superfluous. The State also erroneously suggests that this Court should ignore 
other precedents, as well as an amendment to the statute, all of which are relevant to 
demonstrate that the State's proposed interpretation of the statute is unreasonable. In 
fact, a plain reading of the relevant statute reveals that it does not criminalize the 
specific acts alleged in the information. Therefore, the charging document did not 
confer subject matter jurisdiction on the district court. As such, this Court should 
remand with instructions to vacate the judgment of conviction and dismiss this case. 
B. Idaho Supreme Court Precedent Expressly Allows For Challenges That The 
Information Fails To Charge A Criminal Offense To Be Made At Any Time 
The State, pointing to a distinction drawn by the Idaho Supreme Court between 
due process challenges and true jurisdictional challenges to a charging document, 
mistakenly argues that Mr. Moon is making a due process challenge, and thus, had to 
raise the issue before he entered his guilty plea. (See Resp. Br., pp.8-9, 13.) As 
Mr. Moon is not making a due process challenge, the State's argument in this regard is 
meritless. 
The sequence of decisions in this area of the law is significant to understand the 
flaw in the State's argument. First, the Idaho Court of Appeals identified four categories 
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of jurisdictional challenges that a defendant might make in regard to a charging 
document: "(1) the alleged facts are not made criminal by the statute; (2) there is a 
failure to state facts essential to establish the offense charged; (3) the alleged facts 
show on their face that the court has no jurisdiction of the charged offense; or (4) the 
allegations fail to show that the offense charged was committed within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the court." State v. Izzard, 136 Idaho 124, 127 (Ct. App. 2001 ). The 
Idaho Supreme Court subsequently considered a related argument, which was whether 
such jurisdictional challenges to the charging document needed to be raised before trial 
or the entry of a guilty plea. State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 760 (2004); see also 
State v. Quintero, 141 Idaho 619, 712 (2005) (same). It concluded that the timing rules 
applied to certain types of, but not all, such challenges: 
Under Idaho Criminal Rule 12(b)(2), an objection to a charging document 
must be raised prior to trial or guilty plea unless it asserts a failure to show 
jurisdiction or to charge an offense. Jones' purely due process objections 
to the information filed against him, such as that it failed to include 
adequate factual specificity, were waived by his failure to raise these 
matters before the entry of judgment. 
Id. The Supreme Court determined in both Jones and Quintero that the reference to the 
applicable code section cured the particular due process error of which the appellant 
complained. 1 Jones, 140 Idaho at 759; Quintero, 141 Idaho at 621. Finally, the Idaho 
Court of Appeals clarified that Jones and Quintero had created a particular distinction in 
the law "between the failure to allege an element of the offense or a material fact-
1 The appellant in Jones alleged that the information failed to allege a crime with 
sufficient factual specificity, contending, for example, that it did not expressly set forth 
several elements of the charged offense. Jones, 140 Idaho at 759. Similarly, the 
appellant in Quintero also challenged the sufficiency of the charging document for the 
failure to articulate certain elements of the charged offense. Quintero, 141 Idaho at 
621-22. 
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which may be later proven, admitted to, or inferred from the language in the document 
and the cited statute-establishing what is actually a crime, and alleging acts that do not 
constitute a crime according to the laws of the State." Olin, 153 Idaho at 894. This 
distinction, demonstrates that the State's arguments under Jones and Quintero are 
inapplicable to Mr. Moon's claims. That is because Mr. Moon's claim is not a "purely 
due process objection." See Jones, 140 Idaho at 760. 
When a defendant asserts that he has been deprived of due process, he is 
claiming that he has been deprived of either notice or a meaningful opportunity to be 
heard in a particular matter. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976); 
State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,445 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Wood, 
132 Idaho 88 (1998). The challenges made to the charging documents in Jones and 
Quintero were essentially claiming that the information provided insufficient notice as to 
what the State would be required to prove pursuant to the allegations, either in terms of 
the crime charged (insufficient allegation of the elements of the offense), or in terms of 
the act alleged to be criminal (insufficient allegation of the material facts). See Jones, 
140 Idaho at 759; Quintero, 141 Idaho at 621-22. With that understanding of the 
arguments forwarded in those cases, it is easy to understand the scope of the holdings 
in Jones and Quintero: reference to the code section, which the defendant and/or his 
attorney can easily access and read, provides sufficient notice of the requisite elements 
the State will be required to prove pursuant to the allegations in the charging document. 
See Jones, 140 Idaho at 759; Quintero, 141 Idaho at 621. Similarly, armed with the 
understanding of the alleged crime from the referenced statute, the defendant and/or his 
attorney could infer the material facts from the code section and the statements made in 
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the charging document. Id. As a result, the reference to the code section makes up for 
any deficiency in the notice afforded by the charging document in regard to the 
elements of the charged offense or the material facts in the alleged offense. Id. 
Thus, the result in Jones and Quintero becomes logically clear. Those types of 
challenges to the sufficiency of the allegations in the charging document must be raised 
prior to trial. I.C.R. 12(b)(2); see a/so State v. Cahoon, 116 Idaho 399, 400-01 (1989) 
(quoting United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353, 360 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied). As 
such, the Idaho Supreme Court held that "[u]nder Idaho Criminal Rule 12(b)(2), an 
objection to the charging document must be raised prior to trial or guilty plea unless it 
asserts a failure to show jurisdiction or to charge an offense." Jones, 140 Idaho at 760 
(emphasis added); see a/so Quintero, 141 Idaho at 622. Furthermore, Jones and 
Quintero did not say that such challenges to the charging document could never be 
raised. Compare Izzard, 136 Idaho at 127 (identifying such challenges as 
"jurisdictional" challenges in the second category of challenges: "(2) there is a failure to 
state facts essential to establish the offense charged"). Essentially, all the holdings in 
Jones and Quintero recognize is that, when a defendant decides to plead guilty to a 
particular charge or decides to defend himself against a particular charge at trial without 
complaint of insufficient notice, he is deemed to understand the charges alleged in the 
charging document. See Jones, 140 Idaho at 760; Quintero, 141 Idaho at 622. 
Therefore, his decision to proceed waives his ability to raise a claim that the charging 
document provided insufficient notice at a later date. See id. 
However, it is important to note that the Idaho Supreme Court explicitly excluded 
two types of jurisdictional challenges from the scope of the rule articulated in Jones: 
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those challenges which assert that the charging document failed to demonstrate 
jurisdiction (i.e. , failed to allege a crime occurring within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
court), and those which assert that the charging document failed to demonstrate that the 
acts identified constituted a criminal offense (i.e., failed to actually charge an offense). 
Jones, 140 Idaho at 760; compare Izzard, 136 Idaho at 127 (identifying similar 
challenges in the first, third, and fourth categories of jurisdictional challenges). The 
Court of Appeals subsequently relied on that distinction in its decision in Olin, 153 Idaho 
891. As a result of understanding the scope of the holding in Jones and Quintero, the 
reason that the Court of Appeals' decision in Olin is consistent with those decisions 
becomes readily apparent. 
All the Court of Appeals did in Olin was recognize the distinction made in Jones -
"[t]here is a distinction between a failure to allege an element of the offense or a 
material fact-which may be later proven, admitted to, or inferred from the language in 
the document and the cited statute-establishing what is actually a crime, and alleging 
acts that do not constitute a crime according to the laws of the State" - and applied it to 
the facts at issue. Olin, 153 Idaho at 894. The appellant in Olin was not claiming that 
the charging document failed to provide him with sufficient notice of the crime charged 
or of the relevant material facts. See generally id. Rather, he was claiming that the 
specific acts alleged in the charging document were not made criminal under the statute 
identified in the charging document. See Olin, 153 Idaho at 892-93. 
In that case, no matter how clear the cited statute was about the elements the 
State would have to prove, referencing that statute would never correct the error of 
which the appellant complained (unlike the case in Jones or Quintero) because the 
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alleged conduct would still not be criminalized by the cited code section. See Olin, 153 
Idaho at 892-93. The Court of Appeals explained: 
Though now a crime, as statutorily defined in 2001 and 2002, sexual 
abuse of a child under the age of sixteen years did not include such an act 
[masturbating in the presence of a child]. See Mintun v. State, 144 Idaho 
656, 663-64 (Ct. App. 2007) (holding that soliciting a child "to participate in 
a sexual act," which was prohibited by the sex abuse statute, did not 
include having the child watch and photograph the defendant's act of 
masturbating). In fact, subsection (1)(d) of section 18-1506, the 
subsection that the amended indictment alleged Olin violated, did not exist 
in 2001 and 2002. Hence, this is not a circumstance where an element of 
the crime is missing in the indictment that, if inferred from the language 
of the document and cited code, would establish a crime as in 
[State v. Cook, 143 laho 323, 326 (Ct. App. 2006)] or [State v. Mcnair, 141 
Idaho 263, 268 (Ct. App. 2005)], or where an allegation of fact in the 
indictment establishing a crime, although disputed, is admitted to by the 
entry of a guilty plea, as in [State v. Wegner, 148 Idaho 270 (2009)]. 
Instead, this is a case where the defendant, by guilty plea, has 
admitted to all of the facts alleged in the amended indictment and, 
even still, the acts do not amount to a crime under the applicable 
law. 
Olin, 153 Idaho at 895 (emphasis added). Therefore, the Court of Appeals concluded, 
Unlike the charging documents in cases such as Jones and Quintero, the 
amended indictment charging Olin does not even cite to a section of the 
Idaho code that is applicable to the acts alleged. Thus, we are unable to 
infer facts and elements of the crime to find jurisdiction. . . . If the 
indictment fails to charge an offense, there is no jurisdiction. 
Id. at 895 (emphasis from original). That is the critical difference between Jones, 
Quintero, and Olin, which State fails to comprehend as it argues that Jones and 
Quintero prevent Mr. Moon from arguing this issue through his Rule 35 motion. (See 
Resp. Br., pp.8-10.)2 
2 The State's argument in this regard might carry merit if Mr. Moon were simply 
asserting that the charging document failed to identify an officer or person who had 
proper custody of him ( See Augmentation - Information (failing to identify any person 
other than Mr. Moon, much less identify an officer or person who had proper custody of 
Mr. Moon while he was under pretrial house arrest).) While the Information is 
13 
Mr. Moon is, like the appellant in Olin, claiming that the statute cited did not 
criminalize the specific acts alleged in the charging document. (R., p.1 ("Defendant has 
brought a pleading before this court entitled Motion for Correction of Illegal Sentence, 
whereby alleging that the court lacked statutory jurisdiction for which to charge him for 
an escape in 1996, when the statue was not written to include [the acts alleged to be 
illegal].") Therefore, his challenge is not, as the State believes, precluded by the 
holdings in Jones and Quintero, since he is not alleging a violation of his due process 
rights for lack of notice. Compare Jones, 140 Idaho at 759; Quintero, 141 Idaho at 621. 
Rather, he is alleging that the charging document failed to cite a section in the 
Idaho code that is applicable to the acts alleged. Compare Olin, 153 Idaho at 895. As 
such, like Olin, "this is a case where the defendant, by guilty plea, has admitted to all of 
the facts alleged in the amended indictment and, even still, the acts do not amount to a 
crime under the applicable law." Id. Therefore, like Olin, Mr. Moon's challenge may be 
raised at any time. See id. at 893 (wherein the defendant appropriately challenged the 
charging document for a lack of jurisdiction for the first time on appeal). And, since the 
record clearly demonstrates that the charging document failed to cite a code section 
that criminalized the specific acts alleged in the charging document, his judgment of 
technically deficient in that regard, see I.C. § 18-2505(1), 1995 Idaho Laws Ch. 74 
(under the relevant scenario, one of the elements of the offense is that the person be in 
the proper custody of an officer or other person), that is the sort of challenge Jones and 
Quintero identify as inappropriate to make after trial or the entry of a guilty plea, since it 
only asserts that the charging document alleges an insufficient factual basis for the 
charge. See Jones, 140 Idaho at 760; Quintero, 141 Idaho at 622. However, because 
Mr. Moon is contending that the alleged acts were not criminalized by the cited code 
section, his argument does not fall under the Jones rule; it can be raised at any time, 
even for the first time on appeal. Olin, 153 Idaho at 895. 
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conviction, like the judgment of conviction in Olin, should be vacated. Compare Olin, 
153 Idaho at 897. 
C. The Specific Acts Alleged In The Information Makes It Impossible For The 
Information To Confer Subject Matter Jurisdiction Since They Do Not Constitute 
A Criminal Act Under A Plain Reading Of The Then-Existing Statute 
Contrary to the State's assertions (Resp. Br., pp.13-19), the facts in this case 
clearly show that the charging document failed to allege a criminal offense because the 
code section it cited did not criminalize the specific acts alleged therein. Therefore, the 
charging document did not confer jurisdiction upon the district court in this case. As 
such, since no additional findings of fact are necessary, this Court should, as the Court 
of Appeals did in Olin, reverse the district court's decision denying Mr. Moon's I.C.R. 35 
motion and remand with instructions to vacate the judgment of conviction and dismiss 
that case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
The State makes three distinct arguments on the merits of Mr. Moon's claims: 
(1) that the alleged acts were criminalized under the statute (Resp. Br., pp.18-19); (2) 
that this Court, when determining whether the statute invoked criminalized the actions 
alleged to be criminal, should disregard the subsequent interpretation and amendment 
of the relevant statute on this very question (Resp. Br., pp.13-18); and (3) that the 
record is insufficiently clear to allow for relief (Resp. Br., p.13). In each regard, the 
State's arguments are meritless. 
In regard to the first of the State's arguments on the merits, the alleged facts 
were clearly not criminalized by the statute identified in the charging document. The 
prosecutor's information alleged: "Monte C. Moon is accused by this information of the 
crime of escape, Idaho Code §18-2505, committed as follows, to-wit: ... [Mr. Moon] 
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while charged with a felony and under house arrest, outside the walls of the Bannock 
County jail, did remove a home-monitor device and escape." (Augmentation -
Information.) It is important to note that the State is bound by the prosecutor's decision 
to identify those particular acts as those which would be prosecuted. See, e.g., Olin, 
153 Idaho at 895 (finding that the specific act alleged - masturbating in the presence of 
a child - was not criminalized by the relevant statute); cf. State v. Brazil, 136 Idaho 327, 
331-32 (Ct. App. 2001) (holding, since " a criminal defendant is entitled to be apprised 
by the charging instrument not only of the name of the offense charged but in general 
terms of the manner in which it is alleged to have been committed," a fatal variance 
existed when the proof at trial of the manner of commission differed from the allegations 
in the charging document); State v. Sherrod, 131 Idaho 56, 59-60 (Ct. App. 1998) 
(same). 
Based on a plain reading of the statute, the specific acts alleged by the 
prosecutor in this case, were not criminalized by the cited statute. See I. C. § 18-
2505(1 ), 1995 Idaho Laws Ch. 74. When evaluating statutes, the courts adhere to the 
plain language of the statute unless it is ambiguous. Verska v. St. Alphonsus Reg'/ 
Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 892-93 (2011). To be ambiguous, a statute must have more 
than one reasonable interpretation. Kimbrough v. Idaho Bd. of Tax Appeals, 150 Idaho 
417, 421 (2011). This statute is not ambiguous, since the State's proposed reading of 
the statute is wholly unreasonable, a fact made evident for several reasons. 
First, the plain language of the statute did not criminalize the alleged act. In 
order to escape under the language of the statute, the person must first be confined in a 
jail or prison, or be outside the walls in the proper custody of an officer or person, or be 
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in a factory, farm, or other place without walls attached to the jail or prison. l.C. § 18-
2505(1 ), 1995 Idaho Laws Ch. 74. Since he obviously was not confined to a jail or 
prison, nor was he at a factory or farm attached to such an institution, the only 
potentially-applicable scenario is the second, "outside the walls of such jail or prison in 
the proper custody of any officer or person." However, then-existing precedent had 
already declared that persons in Mr. Moon's situation - pretrial house arrest - were not 
really in custody: "[H]ome confinement, as a condition of pretrial release, is not 
equivalent to confinement in a jail or prison .... " State v. Climer, 127 Idaho 20, 23 
(Ct. App. 1995) (emphasis added).3 Therefore, the Court of Appeals determined, the 
defendant in Climer was not sufficiently in custody, and so, could not be awarded 
credit for the time served under house arrest. Id. at 24. Like the defendant in Climer, 
Mr. Moon was released on his own recognizance, but was subject to home confinement 
as a condition of that pretrial release. (R., p.34; Augmentation - Information.) As such, 
Mr. Moon was not sufficiently in custody, and so, could not be punished for escaping 
house arrest under I.C. § 18-2505. Compare Climer, 127 Idaho at 24. It would be 
inconsistent and illogical to hold that a defendant under pretrial house arrest can be in 
custody for purposes of escape, but not in custody for purposes of credit for time 
served. (See App. Br., p.14 n.2.) He is either in custody in such circumstances, or he is 
not; he cannot, logically or otherwise, be both. Cf. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 
478-79 (1973) (holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
forbids enforcement of a rule to the defendant's detriment without affording him a 
reciprocal right). 
3 The State does not reference Climer its brief at all. (See generally Resp. Br.) 
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The conclusion that Mr. Moon was not "in custody" during his pretrial house 
arrest is consistent with the definition of the term "released on recognizance." The 
relevant definition of "release" is "the action of freeing or the fact of being freed from 
restraint or confinement." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 607 (3rd pocket ed. 2006). Release 
on one's own recognizance is simply the fact of being free from restraint or confinement 
in exchange for the promise without surety or posting of bond, to appear for future trial 
dates. Id. at 608. Therefore, Mr. Moon was released from custody during that pretrial 
period, in exchange for his agreement to be subject to home monitoring. See id. at 
607-08. As he was not in custody, Mr. Moon was not in a situation from which he could 
escape.4 See I.C. § 18-2505(1), 1995 Idaho Laws Ch. 74. 
Second, the conclusion that the statute did not criminalize the alleged actions is 
bolstered by the Court of Appeals' subsequent interpretation of the statute, which 
demonstrates not only the reasonableness of Mr. Moon's interpretation of the statute, 
but the unreasonableness of the State's proposed interpretation as well. 5 See 
State v. Shanks, Idaho 139 Idaho 152, 155 (Ct. App. 2003). In that regard, contrary to 
4 At most, his actions may have constituted a violation of his pretrial release agreement, 
but not the separate crime of escape. (See App. Br., p.14.) 
5 As the Idaho Supreme Court has pointed out, "'the rule of stare decisis dictates that 
we follow [controlling precedent], unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over 
time to be unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, 
obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice."' Greenough v. Farm Bureau 
Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, 142 Idaho 589, 592 (2006) (quoting Houghland Farms, 
Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77 (1990)). The point of that rule is to "'stand by decided 
cases and to maintain former adjudications .... "' See id. (quoting Sherwood v. Carter, 
119 Idaho 246, 256 (1991 )) (noting, however, that this rule should not be blindly 
adhered to when a prior decision is manifestly wrong). The State has made no 
argument that Shanks is manifestly wrong or should otherwise be overruled. (See 
generally Resp. Br.) Nor is Shanks manifestly wrong; were it wrong, the Legislature 
would not have had to amend the statute in response to that holding. See 1995 Idaho 
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the second of the State's arguments on the merits, the decision in Shanks is very 
relevant and should not be ignored by this Court. See Verska, 151 Idaho at 892-93; 
Kimbrough, 150 Idaho at 421. Since persons in Mr. Moon's situation were not "in 
custody," the State's interpretation of the statute simply allows for the prosecution of all 
persons who are merely outside the walls of the penal facility if, at some point in the 
criminal proceedings, they had been confined to a penal institution. While that 
interpretation of the statute would allow for a person to escape while under pretrial 
house arrest, it would also make the third scenario addressed by the statute (escape 
from a factory or farm outside the walls of the penal facility) entirely superfluous. If , as 
the State suggests, the second scenario provides that every person who had, at one 
point or another in the criminal proceedings, been confined to a penal facility, but who 
had gone beyond the walls of that penal institution for any reason, could be charged 
with escape, there would be no reason for the Legislature's subsequent, specific 
designation that persons "in any factory, farm or other place without the walls of such 
jail or prison," since they could be charged under the second scenario as well. 6 See 
I.C. § 18-2505(1), 1995 Idaho Laws Ch. 74. Such an interpretation, as the Court of 
Appeals pointed out in Shanks, is unreasonable because it fails to give meaning to each 
word and phrase of the statute. Shanks, 139 Idaho at 155. 
Laws Ch. 74, Statement of Purpose. Therefore, the idea that this Court should simply 
ignore that precedent is wholly unjustified and should be rejected. 
6 Even if this Court finds that a person on pretrial house arrest is "in custody," this 
conflict would still be created in the statute by the State's proposed interpretation of the 
statute. Both the person under house arrest and the person at the factory or farm would 
be in custody outside the walls of the jail. Therefore, even in that case, the State's 
interpretation of the statute is unreasonable because under that interpretation, the third 
scenario identified in the statute is still subsumed by the second scenario. See Shanks, 
139 Idaho at 155. See id. 
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The State's position is further revealed to be unreasonable by the Supreme 
Court's decision in State v. Roque, 104 Idaho 445 (1983). In that case, the defendant 
was "remanded to the sheriff's office of Ada County for a period not to exceed six 
months" and it was during that time that he allegedly "escaped." Id. at 445-46. During 
that time, Mr. Roque was expected to return to the jail every night, and yet, leaving that 
supervision was insufficient to justify an escape charge. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court 
noted that mere "confinement" was insufficient to give rise to a situation from which the 
defendant could escape custody, and therefore, reversed that conviction. Id. at 446. As 
such, this period of supervised confinement is not the same as custody for purposes of 
the escape statute, and therefore, the statute as it then-existed did not criminalize the 
actions alleged by the State. Id.; see also Climer, 127 Idaho at 23-24. As a result, the 
State's interpretation of the statute is unreasonable and its contention that the alleged 
action of removing a monitoring device was criminalized is meritless. ( See Resp. 
Br., p.18.) 
Finally, the fact that the Legislature, following the Shanks decision, determined it 
necessary to subsequently amend this statute to amend the statute to include removal 
of a home-monitor-device as a scenario that constituted escape reveals that the plain 
language of the statute before then did not include such a scenario. Compare Olin, 153 
Idaho at 895 (noting the subsequent addition to the statute which clarified that the 
conduct alleged in that case was, in fact, illegal, but holding that fact was not relevant, 
since the controlling version of the statute is the version in existence at the time of the 
alleged conduct). The amendment to the statute at issue in Olin was enacted in 
response to the statutory analysis performed in Mintun, 144 Idaho 656. 2008 Idaho 
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Laws Ch. 240, Statement of Purpose. The Legislature declared "[t]he amendment is 
necessary to ensure that the conduct identified and defined by the amendment is 
punishable as a felony." Id. (emphasis added). The fact that the Legislature was 
looking to ensure the act was criminalized under the statute suggests that they thought 
it should have been, even though it actually was not. 
Similarly, in this case, the Legislature intended "to clarify" the statute to ensure 
that the conduct identified conduct was criminalized. 2007 Idaho Session Laws Ch. 
114, Statement of Purpose. Additionally, "[s]tatutes are construed under the 
assumption that the legislature was aware of all other statutes and legal precedence at 
the time the statute was passed .... Therefore, the legislature knew at the time it was 
adding circumstances [to the statute]" it would be aware of other laws impacting on 
those circumstances. Druffel v. State, Dept. of Transp., 136 Idaho 853, 856-57 (2002). 
As in Druffel, when the legislature added circumstances under which a person could be 
charged with escape to the statute, it was aware of the decision in Shanks. See id. 
Since the amendment is addressing the same question that faced the Court of Appeals 
in Shanks, it can be presumed that the legislature was correcting the statute to account 
for the Shanks ruling. See id. This means that the legislature, knowing of the 
Shanks rationale, agreed with it and changed the statute to deal with it. See id. 
However, as noted in Olin, that subsequent addition to or clarification of the statute was 
insufficient to save the charging document based on the prior version of the statute. 
Olin, 153 Idaho at 895. Therefore, as in Olin, the modification of the statute shows the 
unreasonableness of the State's proposed interpretation of the escape statute. 
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The discussion of legislative amendments in State v. Reed, 154 Idaho 120 
(Ct. App. 2012), rev. denied, does not, as the State believes, change this analysis. 
(See Resp. Br., p.17) In Reed, the challenge was that the subsequent amendment to 
the statute added an element that the State would have to prove, and therefore, that the 
evidence originally presented was insufficient. See Reed, 154 Idaho at 1135. Mr. Moon 
is not arguing that the assertion of elements is unclear; rather, he is contending that a 
clear understanding of that statute shows that the acts alleged were never criminalized 
by the statute until it was subsequently amended to add that particular scenario. 
Compare Olin, 153 Idaho at 895; see also Shanks, 139 Idaho at 155 (holding that the 
plain language of the statute did not, in fact, criminalize that behavior). The error in the 
State's argument in this regard is similar to its error regarding the applicability of Jones 
and Quintero - questions as to the elements of the charge are not properly raised later. 
However, challenges to the fact that the act was never criminalized at all remain viable. 
See Olin, 153 Idaho at 895. Besides, this fact pattern is distinguishable from Reed, 
since there is clear precedent that existed before the amendment which held that the 
statute did not criminalize the actions which were identified in the subsequent 
amendment. Furthermore, the Idaho Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the idea that 
"[t]his Court has previously explained that '[w]hen the legislature changes the language 
of a statute, it is presumed that they intended to change the application or meaning of 
that statute."' State v. Leavitt, 153 Idaho 142, 146 (2012). Therefore, given the specific 
facts of this case, it is clear that the Legislature intended to amend the escape statute in 
2007 to include the scenario of removing a home-monitoring device. See id.; Druffel, 
136 Idaho at 856-57; compare Olin, 153 Idaho at 895. That also makes it clear that the 
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1996 version of the statute did not criminalize such actions. See id; See I.C. § 18-
2505(1), 1995 Idaho Laws Ch. 74 
Furthermore, addressing the State's final argument in this regard, the legal 
precedents discussed infra demonstrate that the facts, on their face, clearly show that 
the charging document did not confer jurisdiction on the district court in this case. 
Compare Olin, 153 Idaho at 895. Therefore, this Court should instruct the district court 
on remand, as it did in Olin, to vacate the judgment of conviction, and dismiss the case, 
since it was entered without subject matter jurisdiction. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Moon respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order 
denying his Rule 35 motion. He also respectfully requests this Court remand the case 
with instructions to vacate the conviction for escape and dismiss the case, for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction. If this Court determines that there is insufficient evidence in 
the record to make that determination, Mr. Moon alternatively requests that this Court 
remand the case with instructions for the district court to consider the merits of his 
claims. 
DATED this 25th day of September, 2013. 
B IAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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